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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the performance and resilience of a cyber-physical
control system (CPCS) with attack detection and reactive attack mit-
igation. It addresses the problem of deriving an optimal sequence
of false data injection attacks that maximizes the state estimation
error of the system. The results provide basic understanding about
the limit of the attack impact. The design of the optimal attack
is based on a Markov decision process (MDP) formulation, which
is solved efficiently using the value iteration method. Using the
proposed framework, we quantify the effect of false positives and
mis-detections on the system performance, which can help the joint
design of the attack detection and mitigation. To demonstrate the
use of the proposed framework in a real-world CPCS, we consider
the voltage control system of power grids, and run extensive simula-
tions using PowerWorld, a high-fidelity power system simulator, to
validate our analysis. The results show that by carefully designing
the attack sequence using our proposed approach, the attacker can
cause a large deviation of the bus voltages from the desired set-
point. Further, the results verify the optimality of the derived attack
sequence and show that, to cause maximum impact, the attacker
must carefully craft his attack to strike a balance between the attack
magnitude and stealthiness, due to the simultaneous presence of
attack detection and mitigation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Critical infrastructures such as power grids and transportation
systems are witnessing growing adoption of modern information
and communication technologies (ICTs) for autonomous opera-
tion. While these advancements have improved their operational
efficiency, ICTs may also make them vulnerable to cyber attacks.
Vulnerabilities in ICT systems were exploited in recent high-profile
cybersecurity incidents such as the BlackEnergy [3] and Dragonfly
[1] attacks against power grids and the Stuxnet worm [17] against
nuclear plants. These attacks injected false sensor data and/or con-
trol commands to the industrial control systems and resulted in
widespread damage to the physical infrastructures and service out-
ages. These incidents alert us to a general class of attacks called
false data injection (FDI) against cyber-physical systems (CPS).
Attack detection and mitigation are two basic CPS security re-
search problems, where the attack detection makes decisions in
real time regarding the presence of an attack and attack mitigation
isolates a detected attack and/or reduces its adverse impact on the
system performance. CPSs often have various built-in anomaly de-
tection methods that are effective in detecting simple fault-like FDI
attacks, such as injecting surges, ramps, and random noises. How-
ever, critical CPSs (e.g., power grids) are the target of sophisticated
attackers (such as hostile national organizations), whose attacks
are often well-crafted using detailed knowledge of the system and
its anomaly detection methods. To avoid detection, the attacker can
inject a sequence of attacks of small magnitude and gradually mis-
lead the system to a sub-optimal and even unsafe state. However,
due to the stochastic nature of the physical and measurement pro-
cesses of CPSs, as well as the adoption of stringent, advanced attack
detectors, the well-crafted attacks can be detected probabilistically
[26, 32]. Upon detecting an attack, mitigation should be activated
to isolate the attack or maintain acceptable system performance in
coexisting with the attack.
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Therefore, attack detection and mitigation are deeply coupled
and they jointly define the system resilience against FDI attacks.
On the one hand, a conservative detector may miss attacks, caus-
ing system performance degradation due to the mis-activation of
attack mitigation. On the other hand, an aggressive detector may
frequently raise false positives, triggering unnecessary mitigation
actions in the absence of attacks, while attack mitigation generally
needs to sacrifice the system performance to increase its robustness
against attacks. Thus, it is important to understand the joint effect of
attack detection and mitigation on the system performance, which
serves as a basis for designing satisfactory detection-mitigation
mechanisms. However, prior research on FDI attacks mostly study
attack detection and mitigation separately [6, 20, 21, 26], and falls
short of capturing their joint effect on the system. The studies on
attack detection [20, 21, 26] generally ignore the attack mitigation
triggered by probabilistic detection of attacks, and its impact on
the future system states. On the other hand, the studies on attack
mitigation [7, 23, 33] assume that the attack has been detected,
and ignore the probabilistic nature of the attack detection and any
adverse impact of mis-activation or false activation of mitigation
due to misdetections and false alarms.
As an early (but important) effort in closing the gap, we jointly
consider attack detection and mitigation in the system defense. In
particular, we study their joint effect from an attacker’s perspec-
tive and investigate the largest system performance degradation
that a sophisticated attacker can cause in the presence of such a
detection-mitigation defense mechanism. Studying this largest per-
formance degradation helps us quantify the limit of attack impact,
and serves as an important basis for designing/comparing detec-
tion and mitigation strategies to protect critical infrastructures.
However, the attacker faces a fundamental dilemma in designing
his attack – a large attack magnitude will result in high detection
probability, thus nullifying the attack impact on the system (due
to mitigation) whereas a small attack magnitude increases stealthi-
ness but may do little damage. To achieve a significant impact, the
attacker’s injections must strike a balance between magnitude and
stealthiness.
In this paper, we consider a general discrete-time linear time
invariant (LTI) system with a feedback controller that computes its
control decision based on the system state estimated by a Kalman
filter (KF). For each time step, the controller uses a χ2 attack detec-
tor [25], and activates mitigation actions upon detecting an attack.
Following the Kerckhoffs’s principle, we consider an attacker who
accurately knows the system and its attack detection and mitiga-
tion methods. The attacker launches FDI attacks on the sensor
measurements over an attack time horizon, aiming at misleading
the controller into making erroneous control decisions. As the at-
tack detection at each time step is probabilistic, we formulate the
attacker’s problem as a constrained stochastic optimization prob-
lem with an objective of maximizing the state estimation error over
the attack time horizon, subject to a general constraint that the
energy of the attack signal is upper-bounded. The solution to this
problem naturally leads to an attack sequence that strikes a balance
between attack magnitude and stealthiness to achieve the largest
system performance degradation.
The main challenge in solving the aforementioned attacker’s
problem lies in the fact that the system state at any time depends
on all the past attack detection results, due to reactive attack mit-
igation. Thus, the optimal attack at any time must exhaustively
account for all possible sequences of past detection results, which is
computationally complex. Moreover, the probabilistic attack detec-
tion introduces additional randomness into the system dynamics.
Our key observation to overcome these issues is that the system
dynamics is Markovian and the attacker’s injections at any time
can be computed based on knowledge about it, which captures the
impact of all the past detection results. To summarize, the main
contributions of our work are as follows:
• We solve the aforementioned attacker’s problem using a
Markov decision process (MDP) framework. In our for-
mulation, the sequential operations of probabilistic attack
detection and mitigation are mapped to the MDP’s state
transition probabilities. The MDP is solved by state space
discretization and using the value iteration algorithm [30].
• To illustrate our analysis, we use a real-world CPCS –
power grid voltage control – as our case study. The volt-
age controller adjusts the pilot bus voltages to predefined
setpoints based on voltage measurements by applying feed-
back control on the generators’ reactive power outputs. In
the presence of attack mitigation, the attacker injects false
measurements into the system, aiming at deviating the pilot
bus voltages. Extensive simulations using PowerWorld, a
high-fidelity power simulator, show that the optimal attack
sequence computed using our proposed approach causes
the maximum deviation of the pilot bus voltages from the
desired setpoint.
• Based on the above framework, we also consider the prob-
lem of designing the detection threshold from the defender’s
perspective. To this end, we quantify the impact of false
positives (FP) and misdetections (MD) via an extensive
simulation-based study. Based on these costs, the attack
detection threshold can be tuned to balance the perfor-
mance downgrades due to FPs and MDs depending on the
accuracy of the mitigation signal.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 re-
views related work. Section 3 describes the system model. Section 4
gives the problem formulation. Section 5 describes the MDP-based
solution methodology. Section 6 analyzes the impact of FPs and
MDs on the system performance. Section 7 presents the simulation
results. Section 8 concludes.
2 RELATEDWORK
As mentioned earlier, most of the existing studies treat attack detec-
tion and mitigation problems separately. In the category of attack
detection, the performance degradation caused by stealthy attacks
in a noiseless LTI system has been analyzed [13, 28]. Any deviation
from the expected state trajectory in the deterministic system can
be considered a fault or an attack. However, non-determinism and
measurement noises experienced by real-world systems provide an
opportunity for the attacker to masquerade his attack as natural
noises, thereby rendering attack detection probabilistic. Research
[21], [20], and [26] has studied the impact of stealthy false data
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Figure 1: Block diagram of the system model.
injection (FDI) attacks against stochastic LTI systems, and derived
optimal attack sequences that can cause the worst system perfor-
mance degradation. Bai and Gupta [6] characterize a fundamental
trade-off between the stealthiness level of an attack and the system
performance degradation. However, these studies [6, 20, 21, 26]
generally ignore the attack mitigation triggered by probabilistic
detection of attacks and its impact on the future system states and
attack detection.
In the category of attack mitigation, preventive and reactive mit-
igation strategies have been proposed [11]. Preventive mitigation
identifies vulnerabilities in the system design and removes them to
prevent exploitation by attackers. For instance, in a power system,
a set of sensors and their data links can be strategically selected
and protected such that a bad data detection mechanism cannot
be bypassed by FDI attacks against other sensors and their links
that are not protected [8, 12]. However, preventive mitigation pro-
vides static solutions only, which do not address the adaptability of
strategic and knowledgeable attackers against critical infrastruc-
tures. Thus, in addition to preventative mitigation, it is important
to develop reactive attack mitigation, i.e., countermeasures that
are initiated after detecting an attack and tune the system based
on the estimated attack activities. Reactive attack mitigation is
mainly studied under game-theoretic settings [7, 23]. Specifically,
the attacker manipulates a set of sensor/control signals and aims
at disrupting the system operation, while the defender responds
by tuning the remaining system parameters to negate the attack
or minimize its impact. However, most studies on reactive miti-
gation (e.g., [7, 23, 33]) assume that the attack has been detected,
and ignore the impact of uncertain attack detection on the overall
attack mitigation. In contrast, our framework captures the interde-
pendence between the attack detection and mitigation, and their
joint impact on the system’s dynamics and performance.
3 PRELIMINARIES
3.1 System Model
A block diagram of the system model is illustrated in Fig. 1. We
consider a general discrete-time LTI system that evolves as
x[t + 1] = Ax[t] + Bu[t] +w[t], (1)
where x[t] ∈ Rn is the system state vector, u[t] ∈ Rp is the
control input, and w[t] ∈ Rn is the process noise at the t-th time
slot. Matrices A and B denote the propagation and control matrices,
respectively. The initial system state x[0] and process noise w[t]
are independent Gaussian random variables. Specifically, x[0] ∼
N(0,X) and w[t] ∼ N(0,Q), where 0 = [0, . . . , 0]T and X and Q
are the covariance matrices. The process described in (1) is observed
through sensors deployed in the system, whose observation at time
t , denoted by y[t] ∈ Rm , is given by
y[t] = Cx[t] + v[t], (2)
where C ∈ Rm×n is the measurement matrix and v[t] ∼ N(0,R)
is the measurement noise at time t and R is the covariance. We
assume that v[t] is independent of x[0] and w[t]. Moreover, we
assume that the system in (1) is controllable and the measurement
process in (2) is observable.
The controller uses a Kalman filter (KF) to estimate the system
state based on the observations. The KF works as follows [16]:
xˆ[t + 1]=Axˆ[t]+Bu[t]+K(y[t + 1]−C(Axˆ[t]+Bu[t])), (3)
where xˆ[t] is the estimate of the system state, K denotes the steady-
state Kalman gain given by K = P∞CT (CP∞CT + R)−1, and the
matrix P∞ is the solution to the algebraic Riccati equation P∞ =
AP∞AT + Q − AP∞CT (CP∞C + R)−1CP∞AT . We denote the KF
estimation error at time t by e[t] = x[t] − xˆ[t].
LTI Model in Power Systems. The analysis in this paper is based
on the general discrete-time LTI model described above. As a num-
ber of control loops found in a power system can be modeled using
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Figure 2: IEEE 9-bus power system.
the LTI model, our analysis applies to these control loops. In the fol-
lowing, we provide examples of a discrete-time LTI system, namely
a power system’s voltage control and generator swing equations.
A power system consists of a set of buses (nodes) to which
generators and loads are connected, and transmission lines that
connect these buses. As an example, the IEEE 9-bus test system is
illustrated in Fig. 2.
Voltage control: Power system voltage control refers to maintain-
ing the voltages of selected critical buses (called pilot buses marked
with “P" in Fig. 2) within safe operational limits by adjusting the
output voltage of the generator buses [15]. It can be modeled as an
LTI system described in Eqs. (1) and (2). Specifically, the state vector
x[t] refers to the voltages of the pilot buses at time t , which should
be maintained at a nominal voltage denoted by x0. The control
signal, which is applied at the generator buses, corresponds to the
change in the generator bus voltages, i.e., u[t] = vG [t] − vG [t − 1],
where vG [t] is a vector of the generator bus voltages. Under this
model, the voltage control system can be approximated by an LTI
system with A = I [29], [15]. The control matrix B is an unknown
parameter that can be estimated from real data traces (more details
on estimating the matrix B will be presented in Section 7). Since
the estimation cannot be perfect, the LTI model may be inaccurate,
though the inaccuracies are small and can be captured as process
noise. Since the system state can be directly measured by voltage
sensors deployed at the pilot buses, the measurement matrix is an
identity matrix, i.e., C = I. The system is bounded-input bounded-
output stable if the control algorithm satisfies Bu[t] = α(x0 − x[t])
for α ∈ (0, 1), and this control is adopted in practical systems [29].
However, as the sensor measurements are noisy, the controller can-
not have perfect knowledge of the system state x[t]. Rather, the
state is estimated using the KF-based technique described in (3).
Based on the estimated state xˆ[t], the control can be computed as
u[t] = αB−1(x0 − xˆ[t]). (4)
Generator swing equations: The swing equations establish a math-
ematical relationship between the angles of the mechanical motor
and the generated alternating current electricity [18]. The swing
equations can be linearized and modeled as an LTI system described
by Eqs. (1) and (2) under the assumption of direct current (DC)
power flow[27]. For a power network consisting of n generators,
the state vector consists of 2n entries. The first n entries are the
generator’s rotor phase angles and the last n entries are the genera-
tor’s rotor frequency. The control inputs correspond to changes in
mechanical input power to the generators, and is responsible for
maintaining the generator’s rotor angle and frequency within a safe
operational range. The entries of the matrix A depend on the power
system’s topology (including the transmission lines’ susceptances)
as well as the generators’ mechanical parameters (such as inertia
and damping constants). The structure of the matrix B depends
on the type of feedback control used to restrict the rotor angle
frequency to within the safety range [18]. The measurement vector
y[t] under the DC power flow model includes nodal real power
injections at all the buses, all the branch power flows, and the rotor
angles. The observation matrix C can be constructed based on the
power system topology [22].
3.2 Threat Model, Attack Detection &
Mitigation
Modern-day critical infrastructure systems extensively use ICT for
their operation. For instance, in a power grid, the remote terminal
units (RTUs) and many other field devices are connected by the
internet protocol (IP). The sensor and control data is transmitted
over the Internet using virtual private networks (VPNs) for logical
isolation [14]. However it has been demonstrated in the past that
software-based protection schemes such as VPNs can be breached
by attackers (e.g., see [2]). Additionally, in a power grid, the sensors
(such as the voltage and current measurement units) are spread over
a large geographical area, making their measurements vulnerable
to physical attacks [19, 24]. Such vulnerabilities can be exploited to
launch attacks and disrupt the normal power grid operations.
In this paper, we follow Kerckhoffs’s principle and consider an
attacker who has accurate knowledge of the targeted CPCS and
read access to the system state. Such knowledge can be obtained in
practice by malicious insiders, long-term data exfiltration [1], or
social engineering against employees, contractors, or vendors of a
critical infrastructure operator [17]. Specifically, we assume that the
attacker knows the matrices A,B and C, as well as the operational
details of the KF and the system’s method of anomaly detection
(including the detection threshold). In addition, the attacker also
has read and write accesses to the system sensors.
We consider FDI attacks on the system sensors. Under this attack
model, the compromised observations, denoted by ya [t], are given
by
ya [t] = y[t] + a[t], (5)
where a[t] ∈ Rm is the attacker’s injection. To model the attacker’s
energy constraint, we assume that the norm of the injection, ∥a[t]∥,
is upper-bounded by a constant amax, i.e., | |a[t]| | ≤ amax. Denote
by A the set of all feasible attack vectors that satisfy the above
energy constraint.
We assume that the controller uses the χ2 detector [25] to detect
the attack, which has been widely adopted in security analysis of
LTI systems [20], [26]. We note that our analysis framework can
also be extended to address other attack detectors. The χ2 detector
computes a quantity д[t] = r[t]T P−1r r[t], where r[t] is the residual
given by
r[t] = ya [t + 1] − C(Axˆ[t] + Bu[t]), (6)
and Pr = CP∞C+R is a constant matrix that denotes the covariance
of the residual in the steady state. Denoted by i[t] ∈ {0, 1} the
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detection result of the detector. The detector declares an attack if
д[t] is greater than a predefined threshold η. Specifically,
i[t] =
{
0, if 0 ≤ д[t] ≤ η;
1, else.
(7)
Based on the detection result, the controller applies a reactive
mitigation action. If the χ2 detector’s alarm is triggered, the con-
troller forwards a modified version of the observation ya [t]−δ[t] to
the KF, where δ[t] ∈ Rm is an attack mitigation signal; otherwise,
the controller directly forwards ya [t] to the KF (ref. Fig. 1). Thus,
the controller’s operation can be expressed as
yf [t] = ya [t] − i[t]δ[t]. (8)
With the controller’s mitigation action, the KF estimate is computed
as
xˆ[t + 1]=Axˆ[t]+Bu[t]+K(yf [t + 1]−C(Axˆ[t]+Bu[t])). (9)
The mitigation signal δ[t] can be generated using existing mit-
igation approaches (e.g., [9], [31]). The main focus of this paper
is not the design of the mitigation strategy, but to understand the
impact of the detection-mitigation loop on the optimal attack strat-
egy. Thus, in this paper, we do not focus on a specific mitigation
approach. Instead, we design a generic framework that admits any
mitigation signal. In Section 7, our simulations are based on a perfect
mitigation strategy in which the controller can precisely remove
the attack signal, as well as a practical mitigation strategy in which
the mitigation signal is a noisy version of the attack signal.
Combining (1), (8) and (9), we obtain the dynamics of the KF
estimation error with attack mitigation as
e[t + 1] = AK e[t] +WKw[t]
− K(a[t + 1] − i[t + 1]δ[t + 1]) − Kv[t + 1], t ≥ 0, (10)
where AK = A − KCA and WK = (I − KC). Since the KF is as-
sumed to be in the steady state at time 0, we have E[e[0]] = 0 and
E[e[0]e[0]T ] = Pe = (I − KC)P∞.
4 PROBLEM FORMULATION
Under the Kerckhoffs’s assumption about the attacker’s knowledge,
we analyze attack strategies that can mislead the controller into
making erroneous control decisions. This is accomplished indirectly
by increasing the estimation errors. For a given attack detection
threshold η and mitigation strategy {δ[t]}Tt=1 over a horizon of T
time slots, the optimal attack sequence that maximizes the cumu-
lative sum of KF’s expected norm of the estimation error over the
horizon is given by the following optimization problem:
max
a[1], ...,a[T ]
T∑
t=1
E[∥e[t]∥2] (11)
s .t . KF error dynamics (10),
∥a[t]∥ ≤ amax,∀t .
Maximizing the KF estimation error implies that the controller no
longer has an accurate estimate of the system state. In systems that
use KF for state estimation (such as positioning systems, power
systems, etc.), control input computed based on inaccurate/wrong
system state estimates can adversely affect their performance and
Time (t)
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Figure 3: Attack impact for the voltage control problem.
even result in catastrophic safety incidents. Moreover, the cumu-
lative sum in the objective function implies that the attack has a
sustained adverse impact on the system over the entire attack time
horizon. We note that similar cumulative metrics have also been
widely adopted in control system design to assess the performance
of controllers [5]. Thus, with an objective of maximizing the cu-
mulative metric, the optimal attack sequence will bring the largest
performance degradation to the control systems that are designed
in terms of cumulative metrics.
Relevance to Power System. We illustrate the relevance of the
optimization problem stated in (11) to power grid’s voltage control.
Recall that the voltage controller’s objective is to adjust the pilot
bus voltage to its setpoint x0 by applying control. Fig. 3 shows the
impact of an attack that is able to bypass the χ2 detector (and con-
sequently the controller’s mitigation steps) on the pilot bus voltage.
In this figure, the dotted line indicates the voltage setpoint, and the
solid lines show the evolution of the system state x[t] and estimate
xˆ[t]. The gap between the two curves measures the KF estimation
error e[t]. As evident from the figure, if the attacker manages to
increase the KF’s estimation error using a carefully constructed
attack sequence, then he can cause a significant deviation of the
system state from the desired setpoint. Interestingly, the estimate
xˆ[t] is close to the setpoint x0 that misleads the controller into
believing that the desired setpoint has already been achieved, while
the actual pilot bus voltage continues to deviate.
Intuitively, to cause a significant impact, the attack magnitude
must be large. But at the same time, it is important that the attack
bypasses the controller’s detection – otherwise the attack will be
mitigated. Thus the solution of the optimization problem (11) must
strike a balance between the attack magnitude and stealthiness. In
the following section, we solve the optimization problem (11) using
an MDP-based approach.
5 MDP SOLUTION
In this section, we cast the optimization problem (11) to an MDP
problem [30] and solve it using the value iteration method. Before
doing so, we first state the main challenge involved in solving (11).
5.1 Challenge
The main challenge in solving (11) lies in the fact that the KF error
dynamics, and consequently the attack detection results are coupled
across different time slots. To illustrate this point, we present a
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Figure 4: Evolution of KF estimation error conditioned on
the attack detection results.
pictorial depiction of the KF error dynamics (10) in Fig. 4. As evident
from this figure, the error dynamics of e[t] depend on the sequential
decisions of the χ2 detector i[1:t ] = {i[t]}Tt=1 due to reactive attack
mitigation, which is triggered based on the the attack detection.
Thus, to compute the expected error at any time t , the attacker
must consider all possible combinations of the past attack detection
results i[1:t ] = {i[t]}Tt=1. The complexity of such an approach grows
exponentially in terms of the optimization time horizon T (since at
any time t , there can be 2t different combinations of the past attack
detection results, see Fig. 4). In the following subsections, we present
an efficient solution methodology to solve the attacker’s problem
(11) by modeling it as an MDP, and propose a value iteration based
method to compute the optimal attack sequence.
5.2 Markov Decision Process Model
In this subsection, we develop the MDP modelling of the optimiza-
tion problem (11). Our key observation is that the dynamics of the
KF estimation error in (10) is Markovian. Hence, the knowledge of
e[t] at time t will capture all the past events, and exhaustive search
across all the possible past attack detection results is not necessary.
A state in the MDP corresponds to the KF filter estimation error
e[t] and the actions correspond to the attacker’s injection a[t].
Our approach is to map the KF error dynamics (10) to the state
transition probabilities of the MDP, and the objective function of
(11) to the MDP’s long-term expected reward. The solution to the
MDP is a policy which maps each MDP state to an attacker’s action.
In particular, the optimal policy maximizes the long-term expected
reward of the MDP, and hence solves the optimization problem
(11). The mathematical details of the MDP is presented next. The
structure of the MDP’s solution is illustrated with the help of a
numerical example in Section 5.4.
MDP Modeling Details. Formally, the MDP is defined by a tuple
(E,A,T ,R), where E ⊆ Rn is the state space of the problem
corresponding to the set of all possible e[t]. A is the action space
of the attacker. T(e, a, e′) is the probability of transition from state
e to e′ (where e, e′ ∈ E) under an action a ∈ A of the attacker.
Mathematically, T(e, a, e′) △= P(e[t + 1] = e′e[t] = e, a[t + 1] = a).
R(e′, a, e) is the immediate expected reward for the attacker when
it takes an action a ∈ A in state e ∈ E .
MDP state transition probabilities: We now compute the state
transition probability corresponding to the error dynamics (10).
We adopt the following approach. First, we compute the quantity
P(elb ≤ e[t + 1] ≤ eub
e[t] = e, a[t + 1] = a). Then we use the fact
that for a random variable X ,
P(X = x) ≈ F (−∞,x + ϵ) − F (−∞,x − ϵ)2ϵ ,
where F (x1,x2) = P(x1 ≤ X ≤ x2) and ϵ > 0 is a small positive
quantity.
The result is stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 5.1. For a given e[t] = e and a[t + 1] = a the attack detec-
tion probability at any time t can be computed as P(Y ≥ η), where
Y = rc [t + 1]T P−1r rc [t + 1] is a generalized chi-square distributed
random variable. Further, the quantity P(elb ≤ e[t + 1] ≤ eub
e[t] =
e, a[t + 1] = a) can be computed as the sum of the following terms:
P
( [
0
elb − y2
]
≤ X ≤
[
η
eub − y2
] )
+ P
( [
η
elb − y2 − Kδ
]
≤ X ≤
[ ∞
eub − y2 − Kδ
] )
. (12)
In (12), X ∈ Rn+1 is a concatenated variable given by
X =
[
Y (WKw[t] − Kv[t + 1])T
]T
, y2 = AK e − Ka, and δ is the
mitigation signal.
Lemma 5.1 is proved in Appendix A. For a generic system of
dimensions n,m ≥ 2, it is hard to obtain analytical expressions for
the probability terms involved in Lemma 5.1 (since they involve
a generalized chi-square distribution, as well as the correlations
between the random variables Y andWKw[t] − Kv[t + 1], which
is hard to quantify analytically). However, for the scalar case i.e.
n =m = 1, the attack detection and transition probabilities can be
computed using the Gaussian distribution, as stated in the following
corollary:
Corollary 5.2. For n =m = 1, the attack detection probability
at any time t can be computed as
P
(
Y ∈ (−∞,−√ηPr − CAe − a]
∪ [√ηPr − CAe − a,∞)), (13)
where Y ∼ N(0,CQWTK +R). Further, the quantity P(elb ≤ e[t+1] ≤
eub
e[t] = e, a[t + 1] = a) is equal to the sum of the following terms:
P
( [−√ηPr − y1
elb − y2
]
≤ X ≤
[√
ηPr − y1
eub − y2
] )
+P
( [ −∞
elb − y2 − Kδ
]
≤ X ≤
[ −√ηPr − y1
eub − y2 − Kδ
] )
+P
( [ √
ηPr − y1
elb − y2 − Kδ
]
≤ X ≤
[ ∞
eub − y2 − Kδ
] )
(14)
where y1 = CAe+ a and y2 = AK e−Ka and X ∈ R2 is a zero-mean
Gaussian distributed random vector whose covariance matrix is given
by
Cov(X) =
[
CQWTK + R CQW
T
K − RKT
WTKQC − KRT WKQWTK + KRKT
]
. (15)
The probabilities in (13) and (14) can be computed using the
cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of Gaussian distribution.
Corollary 5.2 is also proved in Appendix A.
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MDP reward: We now map the objective function of (11) to the
MDP reward function. Accordingly, the immediate expected reward
of the MDP is given by
R(e′, a, e) =
∫
e′∈E
T(e, a, e′)| |e′ | |2. (16)
MDP policy and state value function: The solution to the MDP
corresponds to a policy π , which is a mapping from a state to an
action. The state value function of the MDP for a given policy π is
defined as
V π (e) = Eπ
[ T∑
t=1
| |e[t]| |2e[0] = e] . (17)
Optimal policy: The optimal policy π∗ maximizes the total expected
reward, π∗ = arg maxπ V π (e),∀e ∈ E, and the optimal value func-
tion is defined as V ∗(e) = V π ∗ (e).
In the next subsection, we present an algorithm to compute the
optimal policy of the MDP described above.
5.3 Solving the MDP
MDPs can be solved efficiently by value/policy iteration methods
[30]. However, in this work we are dealing with real-world quanti-
ties (for e.g. voltages in a power grid) which are continuous vari-
ables. Hence, the MDP described in Section 5.2 has continuous state
and action spaces1, which makes it impractical to apply a value
iteration method directly. In order to address this issue, in what
follows, we define a discretized MDP obtained by discretizing the
state space of the original continuous MDP. The optimal policy
of the discretized MDP can be used as a near-optimal solution to
the continuous MDP. Existing studies (e.g., [10]) adopt similar dis-
cretization approaches. In the following, we provide only a sketch
of the discretization procedure. More details of the discretized pro-
cedure can be found in Appendix B. This is followed by a value
iteration algorithm to compute its optimal policy.
The MDP discretization procedure is based on the following
three steps:
1. Construct a discretized MDP that mimics the continuous
MDP closely.
2. Solve the discretized MDP using value iteration, which
gives an optimal policy for the discretized MDP.
3. Map the discterizedMDP’s optimal policy to a near-optimal
policy for the continuous MDP.
Let Ξ denote the discretized version of the original state space E,
where Ξ = {ξ1, . . . , ξN }, where N is the number descritization
levels, and T(ξi , a, ξ j ), R(ξi , a, ξ j ) andV (ξi ) denote the state transi-
tion probabilities, the reward and value function of the discretized
MDP. The mathematical details of their computation are provided
in Appendix B. The discretized MDP can be solved using the value
iteration method whose steps are given by the following algorithm:
Algorithm 1 (Value Iteration).
1: Set V
∗
0(ξi ) = 0 for all ξi ∈ Ξ.
2: for t = 0 to T-1 do
1We note that the MDP problem has continuous state and action spaces, but is not a
continuous-time MDP (since we only consider discrete-time LTI systems).
3: for all discretized states ξi ∈ Ξ do
V
∗
t+1(ξi )
← max
a
∑
ξ j ∈Ξ
T(ξi , a, ξ j )
[
R(ξi , a, ξ j ) +V ∗t (ξ j )
]
,
π∗t+1(ξi )
← arg max
a
∑
ξ j ∈Ξ
T(ξi , a, ξ j )
[
R(ξi , a, ξ j ) +V ∗t (ξ j )
]
.
4: end for
5: end for
Algorithm 1 gives the optimal policy of the discretized MDP [30].
Note that the optimal policy of the discretized MDP computed
in Algorithm 1 cannot be directly applied to the continuous MDP,
since we do not know the optimal policy for a state e ∈ E that
is not in the discretized state space Ξ. To address this issue, we
use the nearest neighbour approximation, i.e., for a state e < Ξ,
we choose an action based on the policy of its nearest neighbour,
π (e) = π¯∗(ξi ), where ξi = arg min1≤i≤N | |e − ξi | |. We lastly make
some remarks on the MDP formulation in this section.
• Although in this section we cast the optimization problem
(11) as a finite time horizon MDP problem, our framework can
be extended to the infinite time horizon MDP problem readily by
introducing a discount factor 0 ≤ γ < 1 in the reward function.
The discount factor ensures that the cumulative sum of rewards is
finite as well as the convergence of the value iteration algorithm.
• The optimal cost of the discretized MDP is guaranteed to lie
within a bounded distance from the optimal cost of the originalMDP
[10]. As the discretization is finer, the discretized MDP approaches
to the original MDP more closely.
5.4 Attack Magnitude and Stealthiness
We now illustrate the structure of the MDP solution using a nu-
merical example. In Fig. 5, we plot the attack detection probability
(computed as in (13)) and the attack impact computed in terms of
the MDP’s immediate expected reward (using the result of (14)
and (16)) for different values of attack magnitude a. The system
parameters are n =m = 1, A = 1, C = 1, Q = 1, R = 10, η = 10 and
δ = a. It can be observed that while the probability of detection is
low for an attack of small magnitude, it also has little impact. On
the other hand, the probability of detection is high for an attack of
large magnitude, and consequently the expected attack impact is
also low. The optimal attack lies in between these two quantities.
In this example, the optimal attack that maximizes the expected
immediate reward has a magnitude of 10, and a detection probabil-
ity of 0.3. Thus, the MDP solution strikes a balance between attack
magnitude and stealthiness, resulting in maximum impact2.
6 COST OF FALSE POSITIVES AND
MISDETECTIONS
In this section, we use the framework developed thus far to quantify
the cost of FPs and MDs in a simulation-based approach. We use
2Strictly speaking, MDP solution maximizes the long term expected reward. For the
ease of illustration, in this example we only considered the immediate expected reward.
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Figure 5: Attack detection probability and the expected at-
tack impact (immediate expected reward of MDP) for differ-
ent attack magnitudes.
the cumulative state estimation error (objective function of (11)) as
the cost metric.
To quantify these costs, we consider an LTI system with an
oracle attack detector as the reference system. An oracle detector
is one that has a perfect detection capability, and hence no FPs or
MDs. The cost of FPs is the additional cost incurred due to wrongly
triggered mitigations in the original LTI system, compared with the
reference system. The cost of MDs is the additional cost incurred
due to unmitigated attacks in the original LTI system, compared
with the reference system. In particular, we consider optimal attacks
as derived in Section 5.2 to characterize the worst-case performance
degradation due to MDs. We compute these costs as follows:
Cost of FPs: To quantify the cost of FPs, we compute the state
estimation error (objective function of (11)) in the following two
systems: (i) the LTI system of (1) and (2) with the χ2 detector and
mitigation modules and no attacks, i.e. a[t] = 0, ∀t (ii) the reference
LTI system with a[t] = 0, ∀t .
Under setting (i), all the alarms of the χ2 detector correspond
to FPs, which will wrongly trigger a mitigation action. Since the
mitigation signal is imperfect, it leads to an increase in the esti-
mation error. Note that for the reference system, there are no FPs,
and hence no wrongly triggered mitigations. The difference be-
tween the state estimation errors of the two systems quantifies the
performance degradation due to FP.
Cost of MDs: To quantify the cost of MDs, we compute the
state estimation errors in the following two systems: (i) the LTI
system of (1) and (2) with the χ2 detector and mitigation modules
and optimal attacks (computed as in Section 5.2) (ii) the reference
LTI system with optimal attacks. The difference between the state
estimation errors of the two systems quantifies the performance
degradation due to MD, which we define as the cost of MD.
In Section 7.2, we present simulation results to quantify the
cost of FP and MD under different attack detection thresholds and
mitigation strategies. We also provide guidelines to tune the attack
detection threshold based on this quantification.
7 SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results to examine the system
performance under different attack sequences. Throughout this
section, we use different notations to denote the attacker’s knowl-
edge of the detection and mitigation parameters (ηa and {δa [t]}Tt=1,
respectively), and the actual parameters used by the controller (ηd
and {δd [t]}Tt=1, respectively). While solving the attacker’s problem
(11), we assume perfect attack mitigation in which the attack can be
removed precisely, i.e. δa [t] = a[t], ∀t . From an attacker’s perspec-
tive, this assumption gives an underestimate of the performance
degradation he can cause (since the value of the objective function
of (11) will increase if the controller uses a mitigation strategy
different from perfect mitigation).
While evaluating the attack impact, we consider two mitigation
strategies used by the controller. First, the perfect attack mitiga-
tion δd [t] = a[t], ∀t . However perfect mitigation requires the
controller to estimate the injected attack vector accurately, which
may not be practical. Thus we introduce a practical attack miti-
gation approach under which the attack mitigation is imperfect,
i.e., δd [t] = a[t] + b[t], where b[t] ∈ Rn models the mismatch
between the controller’s mitigation action and the actual attack
vector (possibly due to inaccuracy in estimating the injected attack).
In our simulations, we generate a random vector to model b[t].
7.1 Optimality of the Attack Sequence
First, we verify the optimality of the attack sequence derived using
the MDP-based methodology described in Section 5. We consider a
general LTI model described by (1) and (2) with n = 1, A = 1, C = 1,
Q = 1, R = 10.
We compare the cost function of (11) under three different at-
tack sequences: (i) optimal attack computed using the MDP-based
approach of Section 5, (ii) a constant attack sequence of magni-
tude 10 units and (iii) a ramp attack of the form a[t] = t . The
time horizon of attack T is fixed to 10 units. To implement the
discretized MDP, we truncate the state space in the range [−30, 30]
and discretize it in equal intervals of 0.25 units. Thus, the state
space of the discretized MDP consists of a total of 241 states, i.e.,
{−30,−29.75, . . . , 0, . . . , 29.75, 30}. All the optimization problems
involved in the implementation of the value iteration algorithm are
solved using the fmincon function in MATLAB.
For attack impact, we compute an empirical value of the objective
function of (11) by conductingW simulation runs (whereW is
a large number). Let eω [t] denote the state estimation error at
a time instant t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,T } during the simulation run ω =
{1, 2, . . . ,W }, where eω [t] follows the dynamics given by
eω [t + 1] = AK eω [t] +WKw[t]
− K(a∗[t + 1] − i[t + 1]δd [t + 1]) − Kv[t + 1], t ≥ 0,
where a∗[t] is the attack derived from the MDP policy, i.e., a∗[t] =
π∗(eω [t]). The empirical cost at time t is then computed by averag-
ing over theW simulations, i.e.,
Cost[t] = 1
W
W∑
ω=1
t∑
τ=1
∥eω [t]∥2. (18)
In our simulations, we setW = 10000. To evaluate the empirical cost
under other attack strategies, we use a similar approach and replace
the optimal attack with the corresponding attacks (i.e., constant
and ramp attacks).
Fig. 6 provides a comparison of the cost at different time slots
under the different attack sequences assuming the controller im-
plements perfect mitigation δd [t] = a[t], ∀t . It can be seen that
the cost is greatest for MDP-based attacks, which validates its opti-
mality. To investigate the attack impact under a practical mitiga-
tion strategy, we use a similar approach as described above and set
δd [t] = a[t]+b[t],where we generate b[t] as a Gaussian distributed
random variable with a standard deviation of 15 units. From Fig. 7,
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it can be observed that even under the practical mitigation, the cost
is greatest for the MDP-based attack sequence. Comparing Fig. 6
and Fig. 7, we also observe that the attack impact is greater for the
practical mitigation compared with that of perfect mitigation (since
perfect mitigation completely nullifies the attack’s impact when it
is detected).
7.2 Quantifying the Cost of False Positives and
Misdetections
Next, we present simulation results to quantify the cost of FPs
and MDs following the approach in Section 6. In our simulations,
we consider the aforementioned practical attack mitigation. Fig. 8
shows the cost of FPs and MDs for different detection thresholds
η and standard deviations of the attack mitigation signal σmit. We
note that a low value of η represents an aggressive detector, where
as a high value of η represents a conservative detector. For the
mitigation signal, a low value of σmit represents accurate mitigation,
where as a high value represents inaccurate mitigation. In particular,
σmit = 0 corresponds to perfect mitigation.
From these plots, we observe that as the attack detection thresh-
old η is increased, the cost of FP decreases, while the cost of MD
increases. This result is intuitive – a low detection threshold de-
tects most attacks but also leads to a high number of FPs. Thus,
the wrongly triggered mitigations will result in a high FP cost. On
the other hand, a high detection threshold yields a low number
of FPs, but also increases the number of MDs. The figures show a
basic tradeoff between FPs and MDs, quantified in terms of the cost
function.
We also observe that these costs depend on the accuracy of
the attack mitigation signal. E.g., when the accuracy is high (e.g.,
σmit = 0, 5), the cost of FP is very low, even for a low detection
threshold. Thus, in this scenario, the system operator can choose
a low detection threshold and obtain good system performance
overall. However, when the accuracy of the mitigation signal is
low (e.g., σmit = 15), the cost of FP is very high for a low detection
threshold. E.g., in Fig. 8(d), the cost of FP for η = 0 is greater than
the cost of MD for η = 5. In this scenario, the system operator must
choose a high detection threshold to obtain an acceptable level of
system performance. Thus, our result helps the system operator
select an appropriate threshold that balances between the costs of
FP and MD, depending on the accuracy of the mitigation signal.
Lastly, we note that for σmit = 0 (perfect mitigation), the cost
of FP is zero for all detection thresholds. Under perfect mitigation,
even if an FP event occurs, the controller can accurately estimate
that the attack magnitude is zero (i.e., no attack). Thus, in this
specific case, wrongly triggered mitigations do not increase the
cost of FP. We also note that for η = 0, there are no MDs. Hence,
the cost of MD in this case is nearly zero.
7.3 Simulations for Voltage Control System
Next, we perform simulations on the voltage control system using
PowerWorld, which is a high fidelity power system simulator widely
used in the industry [4]. All the simulations are performed on the
IEEE 9-bus system shown in Fig. 2, in which buses 1, 2, and 3 are
the generator buses, whereas buses 5, 7, and 9 are the pilot buses.
The control matrix B is estimated using linear regression on the
data traces of x[t + 1] − x[t] and u[t] obtained in a PowerWorld
simulation. We present the simulation results next.
First, we verify the accuracy of the LTI model in approximating
the real-world voltage control system by examining the voltage
at pilot bus 5. In our simulations, the voltage controller aims to
adjust the voltage of this bus from an initial voltage of 1 pu to a
setpoint (x0) of 0.835 pu (base voltage of 230 kV) by applying the
control described in (4). Fig. 9 plots the bus voltage from t = 1 to
t = 30 obtained from the PowerWorld simulations, as well as the
voltage values obtained from the LTI model. To average the effect
of random measurement noise, we repeat the experiment 100 times,
and take the mean value. The two curves match well in this figure,
thus verifying the accuracy of the proposed LTI model.
Next, we simulate the impact of the proposed attacks on the volt-
age control system. We assume that the attacker has access to the
voltage sensor of bus 5, and injects false measurements to mislead
the controller. We compute the optimal attack sequence based on
the LTI model using the MDPmethod implemented in MATLAB. To
evaluate the attack impact, we run Monte Carlo simulations using
the PowerWorld simulator by injecting the derived optimal attack
into the voltage measurements, and implementing the control in
(4) based on the corresponding state estimate. Fig. 10 shows the
pilot bus voltage (bus 5) for different attack sequences with η = 5
’s and perfect attack mitigation. It can be observed that the pilot
bus voltage deviates from the setpoint of 0.835 pu, and the largest
voltage deviation is seen under the optimal attack. In particular,
over an attack duration of 30 time slots, we observe that bus 5
voltage deviates to 0.65 pu under the optimal attack, a difference of
about 0.2 pu from its setpoint.
Fig. 11 shows the attack detection probability under these at-
tacks at different time instants. We also plot the optimal policy
computed by the value iteration algorithm (Algorithm 1) in Fig. 12a,
and the optimal attack sequence for three Mote-Carlo instantiations
in Fig. 12b. We observe that the attack detection probability for
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Figure 8: Cost of FPs and MDs for different attack detection thresholds and standard deviation of the attack mitigation signal.
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a naive attack sequence (such as the ramp attack) increases with
time, which results in nullifying its impact (due to attack mitiga-
tion). However, the optimal attack is crafted in a way such that
the detection probability decreases over time. Consequently, the
optimal attack causes a significant deviation of the pilot bus voltage
from its setpoint.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the performance of a CPCS with attack
detection and reactive attack mitigation. We derived the optimal
attack sequence that maximizes the state estimation error over the
attack time horizon using an MDP framework. Our results show
Time (t)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
D
et
ec
tio
n 
 
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
0
0.5
1 Optimal Attack (MDP)
Constant Attack
Ramp Attack
Figure 11: Attack Detection probability for different attacks.
States
-0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2
O
pt
im
al
 P
ol
icy
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
(a)
Time (t)
0 10 20 30
At
ta
ck
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
(b)
Figure 12: (a) Optimal policy for different system states as
computed by the value iteration algorithm. (b) Optimal at-
tack sequence for 3 Monte Carlo simulation instantiations.
that an arbitrarily constructed attack sequence will have little im-
pact on the system since it will be detected, hence mitigated. The
optimal attack sequence must be crafted to strike a balance between
the stealthiness and the attack magnitude. Our results are useful for
the system operator to assess the limit of attack impact and com-
pare different attack detection and mitigation strategies. We also
quantified the impact of FP and MD on the state estimation error,
which helps select the right attack detection threshold depending
on the accuracy of the attack mitigation signal. We demonstrated
the application of our results to the voltage control in a power
system.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS OF LEMMA 5.1 AND
COROLLARY 5.2
Attack Detection Probability. We start with the attack detection
probability. To this end, we derive the relationship between the
residual r[t + 1] and the KF estimation error e[t]. Using (1), (2) and
(5) in (6), followed by some algebraic manipulations, we obtain
r[t + 1] = CAe[t] + Cw[t] + a[t + 1] + v[t + 1]. (19)
Let rc [t + 1] denote the conditional random variable given by
rc [t + 1] △= r[t + 1]
e[t] = e, a[t + 1] = a
= Cw[t] + v[t + 1] + CAe + a, (20)
where (20) is obtained from (19). According to the chi-square de-
tection rule, the attack detection probability for a given value of
e[t] = e and a[t + 1] = a can be computed as
P(rc [t + 1]T P−1r rc [t + 1] ≥ η). (21)
From (20), it follows that the random variable rc [t +1]T P−1r rc [t +1]
follows a generalized chi-square distribution, which can be used to
compute the probability in (21).
In particular for n =m = 1, it follows that the attack is detected
if rc [t + 1] ≥ √ηPr , which is satisfied if (from (20))
Cw[t] + v[t + 1] ∈ (−∞,−√ηPr − CAe − a]
∪ [√ηPr − CAe − a,−∞). (22)
Alternately, the chi-square detector misses the attack if the noise
terms satisfy
Cw[t] + v[t + 1] ∈[
−√ηPr − CAe − a,√ηPr − CAe − a] . (23)
The probabilities of the events in (22) and (23) correspond to attack
detection and misdetection probabilities, which can be computed
using the c.d.f. of the Gaussian distribution.
MDP State Transition Probabilities. Next, we compute the quan-
tity P(elb ≤ e[t + 1] ≤ eub
e[t] = e, a[t + 1] = a). Recall the KF
error evolution in (10). Depending on the attack detection result
i[t + 1], there are two cases:
• Case 1: When i[t + 1] = 0, and elb ≤ e[t + 1] ≤ eub.
• Case 2: When i[t + 1] = 1, and elb ≤ e[t + 1] ≤ eub.
The quantity P(elb ≤ e[t + 1] ≤ eub
e[t] = e, a[t + 1] = a) can be
computed as the sum of probabilities of the two cases. We investi-
gate each case separately and derive its probability.
• Case 1: Substituting i[t + 1] = 0, in (10), we obtain
e[t + 1] = AK e[t] +WKw[t] − Ka[t] − Kv[t + 1]. (24)
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Given e[t] = e, and a[t+1] = a, to have elb ≤ e[t+1] ≤ eub,
the noise terms must satisfy (from (24))
WKw[t] − Kv[t + 1] ∈
[elb − AK e + Ka, eub − AK e + Ka] . (25)
In Case 1, the conditions (21) and (25) must be satisfied
simultaneously, the probability of which can be computed
as the joint probability of the two events given by the result
of Lemma 5.1 (first expression of (12)).
In particular, for n =m = 1, the conditions (23) and (25)
must be satisfied simultaneously, the probability of which
is given by
P
( [−√ηPr − y1
elb − y2
]
≤ X ≤
[√
ηPr − y1
eub − y2
] )
(26)
where X ∈ R2n is the concatenated vector given by
X =
[
Cw[t] + v[t]
WKw[t] − Kv[t]
]
,
and y1 = CAe + a and y2 = AK e − Ka. The probability in
(26) can be computed using the Gaussian distribution as
follows. Since w[t] and v[t + 1] are Gaussian, the terms
Cw[t] + v[t] and WKw[t] − Kv[t] are jointly Gaussian
distributed. It is straightforward to note the mean value of
the concatenated vector, i.e.,
E[X] =
[
E[Cw[t] + v[t]]
E[WKw[t] − Kv[t]]
]
= 0,
and its covariance matrix is given by
Cov(X) =
[
CQWTK + R CQW
T
K − RKT
WTKQC − KRT WKQWTK + KRKT
]
. (27)
Following the above arguments, we can compute (26) using
the c.d.f. of the Gaussian distribution.
• Case 2: Substituting i[t + 1] = 1, in (10), we obtain
e[t + 1] = AK e +WKw[t] − K(a − δ) − Kv[t + 1]. (28)
Given e[t] = e, a[t + 1] = a, and δ[t + 1] = δ to have
elb ≤ e[t + 1] ≤ eub, the noise terms must satisfy (from
(28))
WKw[t] − Kv[t + 1] ∈[
elb − AK e + K(a − δ), eub − AK e + K(a − δ)
]
. (29)
In Case 2, the conditions (22) and (29) must be satisfied
simultaneously, the probability of which can be computed
as the joint probability of the two events, given by the
result of Lemma 5.1 (second expression of (12)).
For n =m = 1, the conditions (22) and (25) must be sat-
isfied simultaneously, the probability of which is provided
in the result of Corollary 5.2 (second and third expressions
of (14)). The probabilities can be computed using the c.d.f.
of the Gaussian distribution similar to Case 1.
Figure 13: A pictorial representation of the discretization
procedure.
APPNEDIX B: MDP DISCRETIZATION
In this appendix, we provide details of the MDP discretization
procedure of Section 5.3. Formally, we define the discretized MDP
by a tuple (Ξ,A,T ,R). Here in, Ξ denotes a discretized version
of the original state space E, given by Ξ = {ξ1, . . . , ξN }, where
N is the number descritization levels, and T(ξi , a, ξ j ), R(ξi , a, ξ j )
and V (ξi ) denote respectively the state transition probabilities, the
reward, and the value function of the discretized MDP. Next, we
elaborate the three steps involved in the MDP discretization as
stated in Section 5.3.
We start with Step 1, i.e., construction of the discretized MDP
from the original continuous MDP. A pictorial illustration of the
discretization procedure is shown in Fig. 13. In this figure, points
ξ1, ξ2, . . . represent a discretized version of the original MDP’s
continuous state space. Note that the points ξ1, ξ2, . . . are a subset
of the original state space. The arrows in Fig. 13 show a mapping
between state transitions of the continuous MDP to those of the
discretized MDP. The mapping is based on the following logic.
Consider all the state transitions in the continuous MDP from
e[t] = ξi , i = 1, 2, . . . , to a state e[t + 1] = e′ < {ξ1, ξ2, . . . } under
an action a. In the discretized MDP, all such transitions are mapped
to a state ξi , i = 1, 2, . . . , that is nearest to e′. E.g., in Fig. 13, all
the state transitions in the continuous MDP from e[t] = ξ1 to the
states e′1 and e
′
2 are mapped to ξ2 (since ξ2 is closest to e
′
1 and e
′
2
in the discretized state space). The state transition probabilities
from ξ1 to ξ2 in the discretized MDP is computed as the sum (and
in the limiting case, the integration) of all such state transition
probabilities of the continuous MDP.
Based on this logic, a mathematically rigorous way to compute
T(ξi , a, ξ j ) from T(ξi , a, ξ j ) is given by
T(ξi , a, ξ j ) = P(ξ j
ξi , a) = ∫
e′∈B(ξ j )
T(ξi , a, e′),
where B(ξ j ) denotes the set of points e′ ∈ E which are closer to ξ j
than any other point ξk ∈ Ξ,k , j . Mathematically, B(ξ j ) is given
by
B(ξ j ) = {e′ ∈ E
d(e′, ξ j ) ≤ d(e′, ξk ), 1 ≤ k ≤ N ,k , j},
where d(x, y) denotes the Euclidean distance between the points x
and y, i.e. d(x, y) = | |x − y| |.
The immediate expected reward in the discretizedMDPR(ξi , a, ξ j )
can be computed as R(ξi , a, ξ j ) = ∑Nj=1 T(ξi , a, ξ j )| |ξ j | |2.
Next, we proceed to Step 2 of the discrterization procedure, i.e.,
computing the optimal policy of the discretized MDP. We use the
notations π∗ to denote the optimal policy of the discretized MDP
andV ∗(ξi ) to denote the optimal state value function of state ξi ∈ Ξ.
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They can be computed using the value iteration algorithm specified
as Algorithm 1.
Finally, we proceed to Step 3 of the discrterization procedure,
i.e., mapping the optimal policy of the discretized MDP to a near-
optimal policy of the continuous MDP. First note that the optimal
policy of the discretized MDP computed in Algorithm 1 cannot
be directly applied to the continuous MDP, since we do not know
the optimal policy for a state e ∈ E that is not in the discretized
state space Ξ. To address this issue, we use the nearest neighbour
approximation, i.e., for a state e < Ξ, we choose an action based
on the policy of its nearest neighbour, π (e) = π¯∗(ξi ), where ξi =
arg min1≤i≤N | |e − ξi | |.
